Relevant Publications

Reports of lab accidents

• open accessMonitoring Select Agent Theft, Loss and Release Reports in the United States - 2004-2010 (Henkel et al. - Applied Biosafety, 2012)
• open access National Bio and Agro-defense Facility Final Environmental Impact Statement - Appendix B, A Review of Biocontainment Lapses and Laboratory-acquired Infections (2008)

Papers reporting Potential Pandemic Pathogen research

• A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence (Menachery et al., Nature Medicine 2015)
• Identification, Characterization, and Natural Selection of Mutations Driving Airborne Transmission of A/H5N1 Virus (Linster et al., Cell 2014)
• Circulating Avian Influenza Viruses Closely Related to the 1918 Virus Have Pandemic Potential (Watanabe et al., Cell Host & Microbe, 2014)
• Alternative Reassortment Events Leading to Transmissible H9N1 Influenza Viruses in the Ferret Model (Kimble et al., Journal of Virology, 2014)
• Airborne Transmission of Highly Pathogenic H7N1 Influenza a Virus in Ferrets (Sutton et al., Journal of Virology, 2014)
• open accessH5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes Transmit in Guinea Pigs by Respiratory Droplet (Zhang et al., Science, 2013)
• Limited airborne transmission of H7N9 influenza A virus between ferrets (Richard et al., Nature, 2013)
• The Potential for Respiratory Droplet-Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus to Evolve in a Mammalian Host (Russell et al., Science, 2012)
• open accessExperimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets (Imai et al., Nature, 2012)
• Multiple genes contribute to the virulent phenotype observed in ferrets of an H5N1 influenza virus isolated from Thailand in 2004 (Maines et al., Virology, 2011)
• open accessMinimal molecular constraints for respiratory droplet transmission of an avian-human H9N2 influenza A virus (Sorrell et al., PNAS 2009)
• Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus (Tumpey et al., Science, 2005)

Critiques and policy discussions

• The ethics of biosafety considerations in gain-of-function research resulting in the creation of potential pandemic pathogens (Evans et al. - J Med Ethics, 2015)
• Limiting the Risks of Biological Research (Lipsitch and Relman - Foreign Affairs, 2015)
• open accessCalls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research (Lipsitch and Inglesby - Annals of Internal Medicine, 2015)
• How likely is it that biological agents will be used deliberately to cause widespread harm? (Inglesby and Relman - EMBO reports, 2015)
• A more systematic approach to biological risk (Palmer et al. - Science, 2015)
• open accessMoratorium on Research Intended To Create Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens (Lipsitch and Inglesby - mBio, 2014)
• open accessCirculating Avian Influenza Viruses Closely Related to the 1918 Virus Have Pandemic Potential (ECDC, 2014)
• open accessCOMMENTARY: The case against 'gain-of-function' experiments: A reply to Fouchier & Kawaoka (Lipsitch, Galvani - CIDRAP 2014)
• Engineered H5N1: A Rare Time for Restraint in Science (Inglesby - Annals of Internal Medicine, 2012)
• Anthrax? That's Not the Real Worry (Lipsitch - New York Times, 2014)
• The risk of engineering a highly transmissible H5N1 virus (Inglesby et al. - Biosecurity and bioterrorism: biodefense strategy, practice, and science, 2012)
• Creating a Mammalian-Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus: Social Contracts, Prudence, and Alternative Perspectives (Osterholm & Relman - J Infect Dis, 2012)
• Great expectations - ethics, avian flu and the value of progress (Evans - J Med Ethics, 2013)
• open accessOn the Need for a National Board To Assess Dual Use Research of Concern (Casadevall et. al - J Virol, 2014)
• open accessThe H5N1 Moratorium Controversy and Debate (Casadevall & Shenk - mBio, 2014)
• open accessBiosafety Considerations of Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza (Imperiale & Hanna - mBio, 2012)
• open accessRethinking Biosafety in Research on Potential Pandemic Pathogens (Lipsitch &Bloom; - mBio, 2012)
• open accessMammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: Facts and Perspective (Osterholm & Kelley - mBio, 2012)
• open access"But Nature Started It": Examining Taubenberger and Morens' View on Influenza A Virus and Dual-Use Research of Concern (Evans - mBio, 2013)
• Policy: Adaptations of avian flu virus are a cause for concern (Berns at al. - Nature, 2012)
• Avian influenza: Ferret H7N9 flu model questioned (Lipsitch - Nature, 2013)
• Comment on Fouchier study (Lipsitch et al. - 2013, Nature)
• NSABB letter (Osterholm, 2012)
• open accessBiosecurity - freedom and responsibility of research (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2014)
• open accessEthical Alternatives to Experiments with Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens (Lipsitch & Galvani - PLOS Medicine, 2014)
• open accessWhy Hasn't There Been More Research of Concern? (Rappert - Frontiers in Public Health, 2014)
• Evolution, Safety, and Highly Pathogenic Influenza Viruses (Lipsitch et al. - Science, 2012)
• Life Sciences at a Crossroads: Respiratory Transmissible H5N1 (Osterholm & Henderson - Science, 2012)
• Gain-of-function research: unproven technique (Mahmoud - Science, 2013)
• Lipsitch et al. Online Commentary posted online in Science (Lipsitch et al. - Science, 2013)
• open accessScientists Will Create A Deadly New Flu Strain, Just To Prove They Can (Salzberg - Forbes, 2013)
• The folly of resuming avian flu research (Hale et al. - FT, 2012)
• open accessExceptional Risks, Exceptional Precautions (Lipsitch - The European, 2013)
• open accessWhat Science Should We Fund? Questioning New Policy on H5N1 Gain-of-Function Research (Evans - SciAm Blogs, 2013)
• open accessA Plea for Caution: Huge Risks Associated with Lab-bred Flu (Müller - Viruses, 2012)
• open accessKeine Experimente! Das Züchten neuer Krankheitserreger ist sinnlos und gefährlich. Es muss aufhören (Lipsitch - IPG, 2014)

Arguments in favor of PPP experiments

• open accessReconstruction of the 1918 Influenza Virus: Unexpected Rewards from the Past (Taubenberger et al. - mBio 2012)
• Globalize the discussion (Fouchier & Osterhaus - Nature 2012)
• Gain-of-function experiments on H7N9 (Fouchier et al. - Nature 2013)
• H5N1 virus: Transmission studies resume for avian flu (Fouchier et al. - Nature 2013)

H5N1 serosurveys

• open accessAssessment of Serosurveys for H5N1 (Toner et al. - Clin Infect Dis, 2013)
• H5N1 influenza virus seroepidemiological studies: The facts revisited (Osterholm & Kelley - PNAS, 2012)
• H5N1 influenza viruses: Facts, not fear (Palese & Wang - PNAS, 2012)
• Comment on "Seroevidence for H5N1 Influenza Infections in Humans: Meta-Analysis" (Van Kerkhove et al. - Science, 2012)
• Seroevidence for H5N1 Influenza Infections in Humans: Meta-Analysis (Wang et al. - Science, 2012)

Articles on Asilomar

• open access From From Asilomar to Industrial Biotechnology: Risks, Reductionism and Regulation (Krimsky - Science as Culture, 2005)
• open access Asilomar Conference on Laboratory Precautions When Conducting Recombinant DNA Research – Case Summary (Peterson - International Dimensions of Ethics Education in Science and Engineering Case Study Series, 2010)
• open access Asilomar and Recombinant DNA (Berg - Nobel Article, 2004)
• open access Historical Events in the rDNA Debate: Phase I [1971- Feb 1975 - realization of potential (1971) to Asilomar Conference (Feb 1975)] - (McClean, 1997)